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MANUFACTURER'S. PRICE LISTS MUST REFLECT ACTUAL
RETAIL PRICES
Regina Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission
322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963)
A manufacturer of electric floor polishers and vacuum cleaners sup-
plied his wholesale and retail distributors with "manufacturer's list prices."
The distributors included these list prices in their local newspaper advertise-
ments in juxtaposition with their own generally lower retail prices. The
manufacturer at times contributed to the cost of these advertisements.
After investigation and hearing, upon a complaint to the Federal Trade
Commission, the trial examiner found that the manufacturer's list prices
were fictitious in that the products were never sold at these list prices, and
that the retailers' prices were the customary charges for these products.
The Commission found that the manufacturer knew that the retailers' prices
were usually lower, that consumers reading the advertisements were led
to believe that the manufacturer's list prices were the normal retail prices
for the products, and that consumers were thereby induced to purchase
believing that they were getting a bargain. The Commission concluded
that the manufacturer, by supplying these fictitious list prices, put into the
retailers' hands the means of deceiving the public within the meaning of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.1 The Commission issued
an order, directing the manufacturer to cease and desist from placing in
the hands of any retailer any material containing "manufacturer's list prices"
which the manufacturer knows, or should know, are in excess of the prices
at which the products to which they refer are customarily sold at retail
in the trade area where the list prices are supplied.2
In challenging the original complaint, Regina based its defense on the
factual argument that its list prices were not excessive or fictitious, 3 thus
conceding the FTC's premise that if Regina's list prices were fictitious,
there would exist a violation of section 5. The conclusion that the practice
of disseminating fictitious list prices is illegal is based on the current policy
of protecting consumers from deceptive practices in advertising. This
policy has developed rapidly in recent years as one-by-one other cases, and
now Regina, have applied the broad language of section 5 to a multitude of
business practices declaring them to be deceptive acts of commerce and
hence illegal.
In 1914 Congress enacted the original Federal Trade Commission Act,4
giving effect to public opinion against deceptive business practices. Although
I Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, as amended, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.
§45 (a) (1) (1959). "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. '
2 Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963).
3 Id., at 767.
4 Federal Trade Commission Act, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
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clothed with a public interest, the Federal Trade Commission under the
original section 5 could act only where actual or potential injury to com-
petition could be shown.5 In 1931, the Supreme Court in FTC v. Raladam
Co.6 held that the Commission could not act where only injury to the
public resulted from deceptive practices. This case prompted the passage
of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment 7 which, in effect, extended the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission to all cases where injury to the public
existed regardless of the presence of injury to competition." Thereafter,
the cases recognized fictitious pricing not only as unfair competition, but
also as a violation of the act itself, since the practice was deceptive to the
public.9
The trend progressed when subsequent cases held that neither intent to
deceive 10 nor actual deception 1 of the public was required to constitute
violations of the act. It has also been established that the statements in
question need not be false in fact, where deception can be accomplished
by innuendo ;12 and that one who places in the hands of another the means
of deceiving the public is himself guilty of violating the act.' 3 In short,
the law now prohibits business practices which tend to deceive the public as
to the true value or quality of the products offered for sale. This protection
of the public, which is extended to the unthinking, ignorant and impulsive
buyer, is predicated on the principle that public good-will promotes com-
petition and prosperity, and on the underlying belief that fair play should
govern business dealings.
Deceptive pricing has become one of the most prevalent forms of false
advertising today.' 4 Deceptive pricing can take many forms, the most
recent of which is the "manufacturer's list price." This relatively new idea
probably evolved from the ceiling prices established for some products by
5 International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 297-299 (1930); FTC v. Win-
sted Hoisery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
6 283 U.S. 643, 646-647 (1931).
7 Wheeler-Lea Amendment § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1)
(1959).
8 Pep Boys-Manny, Moe and Jack Inc. v. FTC 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941);
Thomas v. FTC, 116 F2d 347 (10th Cir. 1940).
9 International Art Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 393, (7 Cir. 1940); Thomas v. FTC,
supra note 8.
10 Bankers Securities Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961); Pep Boys-
Manny, Moe and Jack, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 8.
11 FTC v. Sterling Drugs, Inc. 317 F.2d 669, (2d Cir. 1963) ; Goodman v. FTC,
244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957); Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F2d 103 (7th
Cir. 1946).
12 Baker's Franchise Corp. v. FTC, 302 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1962). A manu-
facturer claimed that its bread contained less calories per slice than any other regular
white bread. This claim was true because the bread had thinner slices; but based
upon lay testimony at the hearing, the Commission concluded that consumers were
led to believe that this bread would help them lose weight as a dietary product, and
that they were thereby deceived within the meaning of section 5.
13 C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. FTC, 197 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1952); FTC v.
Winsted Co., supra note 5, at 494.
14 Barnes, "False Advertising," 23 Ohio St. L.J. 597, 629 (1962).
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war emergency federal legislation.15 In 1958, the Federal Trade Com-
mission published guides to be used by its staff in determining whether
certain pricing practices violated the act. One of the major abuses listed
was false savings claims based on terms such as "manufacturer's list prices"
and "manufacturer's suggested retail prices" used in quoting excessive retail
prices, and thereby deceiving the public.16
There has been much recent litigation on the closely associated practice
of placing fictitious retail prices on the actual product itself, or "preticket-
ing," 17 and the Federal Trade Commission has issued cease and desist
orders to other manufacturers 18 who were issuing or publishing fictitious
manufacturer's list prices prior to the Regina decision. Therefore, in
Regina, the court of appeals confirmed the policy of the Federal Trade
Commission of condemning fictitious list pricing.
The most typical argument against a cease and desist order prohibiting
fictitious list prices is that competitors of the respondent are engaging in
the same practice and that by being "singled out" the respondent will be
put at a competitive disadvantage and suffer great financial loss.19 In
Regina, the court of appeals dispensed with this argument, as it has in the
past, saying that in the absence of a patent abuse of discretion, the Com-
mission is empowered to employ whatever remedy it deems necessary to
achieve the ends contemplated by Congress, and that the court will not
refuse enforcement of an order just because the law is not being strictly
enforced against others.20
Two other arguments frequently advanced in support of manufacturer's
list prices are (1) that a standard price set by the manufacturer establishes
the product and its supposed quality in the consumer's mind thus enabling
him properly to identify the product, and (2) that Congress sanctioned the
use of manufacturer's list prices by requiring their use by the automobile
industry under the Automobile Information Disclosure Act.21 As to
product identification, there are more effective methods of identifying prod-
ucts than by a non-descriptive price. These methods include trade names,
model numbers, and product descriptions. To argue that a fictitious list
15 Comment, "Deceptive Advertising Practices," 39 Texas L. Rev. 903, 906
(1962).
16 2 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. § 7897 (1958).
17 Helbrps Watch Co., v. FTC, 310 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Clinton Watch
Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1961). See Address by Daniel J. Murphy, Ameri-
can Marketing Association, New York, N.Y., December 27, 1961, in 6 Antitrust Bull.
419, 426.
18 it re Firestone Tire Co., 33 F.T.C. 282 (1941) ; In re Hutchinson Chemical
Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1942 (1959) ; In re Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 56 F.T.C. 41 (1959) ;
In re Sam Schneider, dba Continental Sales & Sewing Mach. Co., 56 F.T.C. 36 (1959).
19 Regina Corp. v. FTC, supra note 2, at 769; Accord, Clinton Watch Co. v.
FTC, supra note 17, at 840; Niresk Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337, 343 (7th
Cir. 1960).
20 Cases cited note 19 supra; See Jaffe, "The Judicial Enforcement of Adminis-
trative Orders," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 865, 878 (1963).
21 Automobile Information Disclosure Act, 72 Stat. 325 (1953) ; 15 U.S.C. §1231-
1233 (1959).
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price will enable consumers to identify the product lends little support to a
respondent's position. As to the second argument, Congress passed the
Automobile Information Disclosure Act because of the deceptive pricing
practices existing in the automobile industry. The act requires manufac-
turers to inform the consumer of the true market price of the automobile
and its accessories in order to eliminate dealer's deceptive practices. It is
clear that the act applies only to the automobile industry and that Congress
did not approve the use of fictitious list pricing.22 It is important to note
that the court of appeals has not ruled that list prices are illegal per se,
but only that they are illegal when they are fictitious.
23
That honesty in business should govern our competitive system has
been long established.24 The traditional doctrine of caveat emptor has
gradually given way to a rule that gives the consumer the right to rely on
the representations of merchants as true.23  Mutual confidence between
buyer and seller is necessary to our economy, and when buyer confidence
is destroyed by deceptive practices, the free workings of supply and demand
are distorted. By deception, the seller is able to obtain money from the
buyer that he would not otherwise obtain. After realizing that he has been
deceived, the buyer becomes confused as to the true value of goods, and
he is reluctant to invest again. The honest seller is affected in that the
buyers are unfairly diverted from his product and over the long run the
seller feels the general business decline generated by the buyers' reluctance
to invest. Once fictitious pricing has proven successful in an industry, the
honest businessman often find it necessary to resort to such practices as a
matter of survival. Thus, fictitious pricing not only affects the individual
competitor, but by eventually infecting entire industries, the practice may
adversely affect the whole economy.
When honest business practices prevail, the supply and demand prin-
ciple runs true to form. The price of goods is established and the buyer
relies on the price as a true indication of the products' value. The consumer
is willing to purchase and bases his choice among makes of products on
such rational factors as utility, quality, appearance, and true price difference.
When the consumer is able to base his choice on the qualitative difference
among the various makes, competition is promoted which tends to encour-
age higher quality production.2 6
Although the injury from deceptive pricing may be great in the aggre-
gate, the loss to the individual may not be sufficient to warrant a private
suit to stop the unfair practice. Therefore the consumer's right to be
22 Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 608, 611-612 (4th Cir. 1961); See
Murphy, supra note 17.
23 Regina Corp. v. FTC, supra note 2, at 770; Helbros Watch Co. v. FTC, supra
note 17, at 870 n.9; Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, supra note 22, at 612.
24 FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
25 FTC v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., supra note 11, at 674.
26 Murphy, supra note 17, at 427-428; Comment, "Deceptive Advertising Prac-
tices," supra note 15; Moore, "Deceptive Trade Practices and the FTC," 28 Tenn.
L. Rev. 493, 504 (1961).
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protected from deceptive pricing is generally enforced only through an
administrative agency acting in the interest of all consumers.
Because the FTC can act only against those manufacturers engaged
in interstate commerce, action against deceptive pricing has been limited
in scope.27 A substantial percentage of manufacturing is confined within
state boundaries, and the majority of retailers do not engage in interstate
commerce.28 It follows, therefore, that if the policy of protecting the con-
sumer from deceptive pricing practices is to be effectively enforced, the
various state and local agencies should actively assist in demanding higher
standards of business ethics.
It is evident that the harmful affects of fictitious list pricing on
economics and competition warrant the conclusion that the practice should
be condemned. But, injury to competition and to our economy are results
of deception of the public. Thus, it would be reasonable to conclude that
Congress made deceptive acts in commerce unlawful because such practices
may lead to unfair competition or harm to the economy as a whole. How-
ever, a closer look at section 5 of the act reveals an intent to apply the
statute broadly to cases where public deception has no direct relation what-
soever to economics or competition. 29 The consumer is given legal pro-
tection. An injury occurs when the consumer is misled as to the true
market value of his purchase, and as to anticipated savings. The manu-
facturer is in a position to know the true market value of his product while
the consumer must rely to a great extent on what he is told. The consumer
and manufacturer are not in a position to deal at "arn's length" as to the
price of the product, and for the manufacturer to deceive the consumer
is contrary to our concept of fair play. It is obvious that the law cannot
aid consumers whose injury is caused by their own misjudgment of known
facts, but protection should be afforded to those injured through deception.
The manufacturer's product should stand on its own merits in the market
place and if it cannot compete on this basis, it should not be allowed to
compete through deceptive means.
27 Murphy, supra note 17, at 427.
28 Ibid.
29 "This amendment [to FTC Act §5] makes the consumer who may be injured
by an unfair trade practice of equal concern before the law with the merchant injured
by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor." 83 Cong. Rec. 3255 (1938)
(remarks of Senator Wheeler).
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